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REVIEW ARTICLE OPEN
Directed acyclic graphs: a tool for causal studies in paediatrics
Thomas C Williams1,2, Cathrine C Bach3,4, Niels B Matthiesen3,4, Tine B Henriksen1,4 and Luigi Gagliardi1,5
Many paediatric clinical research studies, whether observational or interventional, have as an eventual aim the identiﬁcation or
quantiﬁcation of causal relationships. One might ask: does screen time inﬂuence childhood obesity? Could overuse of paracetamol
in infancy cause wheeze? How does breastfeeding affect later cognitive outcomes? In this review, we present causal directed acyclic
graphs (DAGs) to a paediatric audience. DAGs are a graphical tool which provide a way to visually represent and better understand
the key concepts of exposure, outcome, causation, confounding, and bias. We use clinical examples, including those outlined
above, framed in the language of DAGs, to demonstrate their potential applications. We show how DAGs can be most useful in
identifying confounding and sources of bias, demonstrating inappropriate statistical adjustments for presumed biases, and
understanding threats to validity in randomised controlled trials. We believe that a familiarity with DAGs, and the concepts
underlying them, will be of beneﬁt both to the researchers planning studies, and practising clinicians interpreting them.
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INTRODUCTION
A wide variety of studies are undertaken with the aim of
understanding and improving paediatric health, and in particular
to identify the causal processes that lead to the development of
health outcomes or disease. To achieve this, it is helpful to deﬁne a
number of variables (for the beneﬁt of the reader unacquainted
with the technical language that follows, we have created
a Supplemental Glossary available online). For example, in a study
looking at the relationship between screen time (time spent
watching television, using computers or games consoles) and
childhood obesity,1 the authors hypothesised that more screen
time (the exposure) may lead to an increased risk of childhood
obesity (the outcome). The exposure may cause the outcome not
directly but through an intermediate process—a direct reduction
in physical activity (the intermediate variable or mediator). Finally,
we want to identify factors that inﬂuence both the exposure and
the outcome, but are not directly in the causal pathway. An
example is low parental education, which is a cause of both
increased screen time and an increased risk of obesity/over-
weight.2,3 In this situation, low parental education acts as what is
called a confounder. If not recognised and controlled for, this
could lead to a false interpretation of the true relationship
between the two variables, for example by falsely attributing
obesity solely to increased screen time.
We will not attempt to summarise the history, philosophy and
applications of causal inference, but instead in this review focus
on the use of a graphical tool, causal directed acyclic graphs
(DAGs). DAGs provide a simple way of graphically representing,
communicating and understanding key concepts of relevance
to practising clinicians and researchers, and are particularly helpful
in delineating and understanding confounders and potential
sources of bias in exposure–outcome relationships. A bias is a
systematic, incorrect interpretation of the true relationship
between the exposure and the outcome. Biases differ from
random error in that they distort our interpretation of true causal
relationships in a non-random way: repeating a study, or
increasing the sample size, will not lead to the elimination of
bias. Confounders and biases may distort our interpretations in a
variety of ways. If the researcher is not aware of confounders, and
does not appropriately control for them, a variable may
erroneously appear to cause the outcome where there is no
causal relationship, or the magnitude of this relationship may be
distorted. Conversely, if a researcher treats variables associated
with both exposure and outcome as confounders when they in
fact are not (see below), and inappropriately controls for them,
this too may cause bias.
We ﬁrst discuss how to create and interpret DAGs, using
paediatric examples to demonstrate how they can identify, and
appropriately correct for, confounders and biases in observational
studies that can affect our ability to draw correct conclusions
about causal relationships. We then outline how they can be
helpful in interpreting interventional studies, and understanding
potential threats to validity in these. After outlining some of the
limitations of DAGs, we conclude with some thoughts on how
they might prove useful for researchers and clinicians.
CREATING AND INTERPRETING A DAG
Diagrams have been used to represent causal relationships for
many years, in a variety of ﬁelds ranging from genetics to
sociology.4–7 However, in recent years an epidemiological
literature outlining a standard terminology and set of rules,8 has
grown around DAGs. In a DAG, causal relationships are
represented by arrows between the variables, pointing from
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cause to effect. As seen in Fig. 1a, an arrow from screen time to
obesity means that we hypothesise that a change in screen time
causes a change in adiposity. DAGs must obey two rules. First,
they must be acyclic, which means that it is impossible to start at
any variable in the DAG, follow the directed arrows forward, and
end up at the same variable. In other words, a DAG must not
contain a feedback loop where a variable causes itself. A corollary
of this is that a causal relationship between two variables must be
unidirectional: they cannot cause each other. Bidirectional arrows,
often used to depict feedback loops, are in fact a simple graphical
expedient to show as a single variable what in reality is a
sequence of variables.9 Second, for a DAG to be complete, the
shared cause of any two variables in the DAG must be included.10
In a DAG, two variables can be connected by what is called a
“path” between them. Open “paths” represent statistical associa-
tions between two variables; closed “paths” represent the absence
of such associations (the correspondence between path “open-
ness” and associations in DAGs derives from mathematics).8
Variables and arrows can be combined into three main types of
paths as follows:
1. Directed paths: all arrows point in the same direction, and
the association between these variables reﬂects a causal
relationship. Such a path is open. Increased screen time
leads directly to reduced physical activity, which in turn
leads to an increased risk of obesity (Fig. 1b).
2. Backdoor paths: this is where two variables share the same
cause. Looking at Fig. 1c, increased screen time and
childhood obesity are inﬂuenced by low parental education.
In the terminology of DAGs, screen time and childhood
adiposity are said to be connected by a backdoor path
through low parental education. This path (one that
connects exposure and outcome through a third variable,
including an arrow entering rather than emanating from the
exposure) is open, and depicts a statistical association
between screen time and adiposity, through low parental
education. However, the association transmitted by this
backdoor path is non-causal, and represents the basic
structure of confounding.
3. Closed (or blocked) paths: this is when two variables have
the same effect, called a collider (Fig. 1d). For example, both
screen time and obesity have been found to increase the
risk of low self-esteem, self-harm and suicidal ideation in
adolescents,11–13 that is self-harm is a collider between
physical activity and obesity. In this situation, unlike directed
and backdoor paths, this path is closed: there is no
association between screen time and adiposity transmitted
through self-harm.
Researchers can change the status of a path from open to
closed, or vice versa, by acting on (conditioning on, or controlling
for) a variable, which can occur through study design or statistical
adjustments such as restriction, stratiﬁcation, matching, standar-
disation, or multivariable regression. Controlling for parental
education (a confounder) in our example will close this backdoor
path, and lead to a less biased relationship in the directed path
between screen time and adiposity. Conversely, conditioning on a
variable in a directed path between two variables (a mediator),
physical activity in our example, closes this path, and could lead to
an incorrect estimate of the true overall association between the
variables. Finally, conditioning on a variable in a closed path (a
collider) opens this path and leads to transmission of a non-causal
association. If we were to mistakenly identify self-harm as a
confounder, and condition on it, this would distort the true
relationship between the exposure and the outcome. Equally, if a
study examined the relationship between screen time and obesity
in a group of adolescents selected because they had a history of
self-harm, this would again represent conditioning on a collider, in
this case by restriction (see “selection bias” below).
USING DAGS TO UNDERSTAND CONFOUNDING: PARACETAMOL
AND WHEEZE
In the language of DAGs, a confounder is deﬁned as a common
cause of the exposure and the outcome. This situation occurs in
nature; it is not created by the researcher. Confounders, if not
identiﬁed and appropriately adjusted for (conditioned on), can
distort the true causal relationship between an exposure and an
outcome. As an example, a number of observational studies14,15
found an association between receiving paracetamol in the ﬁrst
year of life and later risk of developing wheeze/asthma. DAGs
have proven useful in examining this relationship.16
In fact, the increased risk of later wheezing may not be due to
paracetamol, but to confounding. Viral respiratory tract infections
—for which paracetamol is prescribed—are common in children,
trigger wheezing and might increase the risk of later wheeze.17,18
That is, viral infections act as a confounder in the relationship
between paracetamol usage and wheezing (Fig. 2a) (so-called
confounding by indication).19,20 Therefore we might expect these
two variables (paracetamol use and wheeze) to be statistically
Screen time
a
b
c
d
Screen time
Parental education
Parental education
Screen time
Screen time
Physical activity
Physical activity
Self-harm
Obesity
Obesity
Obesity
Physical activity Obesity
Fig. 1 a Screen time (the exposure) causes obesity (the outcome). b
Screen time acts on obesity through the mediator of physical
activity. c Low parental education increases both screen time and
obesity, and is therefore a confounder. d Self-harm is a collider in the
path from screen time to obesity
Viral infections
Viral infections
b
a
Paracetamol
Paracetamol
Wheeze in first year
Wheeze in first year
Later wheeze
Later wheeze
Fig. 2 a Viral infections cause both paracetamol use and wheeze,
acting as a confounder. b This bias can be controlled by
conditioning on the confounder (shown by a box around viral
infections)
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associated through a common cause, even if there is no direct
causal association. To identify the true causal relationship between
paracetamol use and later wheeze, one should condition on viral
infections. Conditioning in a DAG is generally shown as a box
around the variable, and as described previously changes an open
path (in this case a backdoor path) to a closed path (Fig. 2).
Once we have closed this backdoor path by making the
appropriate statistical adjustments, and assuming there are no
other confounders, we should be able to identify the true
magnitude, if any, of the relationship between paracetamol use
and wheeze. Supporting this hypothesis, studies which have
conditioned on respiratory tract infections in early life ﬁnd a
diminished relationship between paracetamol use and later
wheeze, suggesting that part of this apparent relationship may
be due to confounding.16,21,22
RISKS OF INAPPROPRIATE ADJUSTMENT: OVERADJUSTMENT
Whilst failing to identify confounders can threaten the validity of
ﬁndings, the converse, inappropriately identifying other variables
as confounders, can also be problematic.23 Take the relationship
between the administration of antenatal steroids (the exposure)
and the outcome of bronchopulmonary dysplasia (BPD) (Fig. 3a). A
number of studies found that administration of antenatal steroids
was not associated with a decreased risk of BPD,24–26 despite
reducing several known risk factors for BPD. These studies
adjusted for variables such as severity of neonatal disease,24 and
need for mechanical ventilation,24–26 the rationale being that
these factors are associated with both the administration of
antenatal steroids and an increased risk of BPD.
However, these variables do not fulﬁl the deﬁnition of a
confounder (they are not causes of both exposure and outcome),
but act as mediators between the exposure (antenatal steroids)
and the outcome (BPD) (Fig. 3b). Conditioning on a mediator
closes one of the causal paths between antenatal steroids and
BPD and distorts the overall relationship between the two. This is
represented in Fig. 3c by the boxes surrounding the two
intermediate variables. Adjusting for (conditioning on) an inter-
mediate results in overadjustment. With this process we remove
the part of the association between antenatal steroids and BPD
mediated through the reduction of severe illness, or the reduced
need for mechanical ventilation.27 This adjustment can attenuate
the true causal effect of the exposure or even reverse it, leading to
counterintuitive results.
Supporting the interpretation that overadjustment might
explain the apparent lack of effect of antenatal steroids on the
development of BPD, a cohort study28 found a negative
(protective) association between antenatal steroid administration
and mediators (severity of neonatal disease and the need for
mechanical ventilation), and a positive association between the
mediators and the risk of the BPD. The authors found a protective
effect of steroids on BPD when intermediate factors were not
adjusted for, but not when they adjusted for these intermediate
variables (Fig. 3c). That is, inappropriately conditioning on
mediators led to a distortion of the true (likely protective)
relationship between antenatal steroids and risk of developing
BPD. Of note, whilst conditioning on mediators distorts the overall
relationship between an exposure and an outcome, Fig. 3c also
shows that this should reveal the direct effect of steroids on BPD
(with the highly simpliﬁed assumption that there are no other
common causes of steroid administration, BPD, or the mediators);
this concept underlies the ﬁeld of mediation analysis.29,30
SELECTION BIAS IN THE LANGUAGE OF DAGS
In observational or interventional studies, selection bias occurs
when both the exposure and the outcome affect whether an
individual is included in the analyses. In the language of DAGs,
selection bias occurs due to inappropriate conditioning on a
collider. An example are studies that examined HLA subtypes (the
exposure) as risk factors for the development of acute lympho-
blastic leukaemia (ALL, the outcome). Initial cross-sectional studies
using prevalent (i.e. already diagnosed) cases and matched
controls31–33 found an increased risk of developing ALL in
individuals with the HLA-A2 serotype (Fig. 4a).
However, a subsequent study34 examined patients presenting
with a new diagnosis of ALL (incident cases), and found that the
frequency of HLA-A2 in these individuals matched that of the
general population. When examining survivors at the time of
typing, they found that the frequency of HLA-A2 was higher than
in the general population, and that length of survival appeared to
be associated with the HLA-A2 serotype. That is, HLA-A2 was not
associated with an increased risk of developing ALL, but rather
with an increased chance of survival. Because previous studies had
examined a prevalent population (patients with a previous
diagnosis of ALL) rather than an incident one (those presenting
with a new diagnosis), they had examined the relationship
between HLA-A2 and leukaemia in a sample restricted to
survivors, and an incorrect association was inferred between the
exposure and the outcome.
Presented as a DAG, the source of this bias, also called
“incidence-prevalence” or Neyman’s bias,35,36 can be seen to be
due to conditioning on a collider. In this case, both the exposure
and the outcome inﬂuence a third variable, survival, which acted
as a collider (Fig. 4b). If we consider all patients—surviving or not
—by including newly diagnosed patients, the two variables are
not associated (the path is closed). Conditioning on survival (by
Antenatal steroids
a
b
c
Disease severity
Mechanical ventilation
Disease severity
Mechanical ventilation
Antenatal steroids
Antenatal steroids
BPD
BPD
BPD
Fig. 3 a Antenatal steroids affect the risk of bronchopulmonary
dysplasia (BPD). b Antenatal steroids also have indirect effects. c By
controlling for disease severity and mechanical ventilation, we
underestimate the true overall effect of the antenatal steroids
HLA subtype ALL
HLA subtype
b
a
Survival
ALL
Fig. 4 a A possible relationship: HLA subtypes affect the risk of
acute lymphoblastic leukaemia (ALL). b The true causal structure,
showing selection bias: both HLA subtype and ALL inﬂuence
survival, and the study is conducted in survivors
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restricting the inclusion to patients surviving a certain time, as
shown by the box surrounding survival in the ﬁgure), opens the
path through the collider, and we enrich the sample for
individuals with HLA-A2 among ALL patients, creating a (spurious)
association.
OVERADJUSTMENT AND SELECTION BIAS
Overadjustment and selection bias can also coexist. Take the
relationship between maternal pre-eclampsia (the exposure) and
subsequent cerebral palsy (the outcome): pre-eclampsia is
hypothesised to be directly causative of cerebral palsy. However,
pre-eclampsia is also associated with a higher risk of medically
indicated preterm birth, which in turn is associated with a higher
risk of cerebral palsy (Fig. 5a). We might think to examine the
effect of pre-eclampsia after adjusting for preterm birth or
gestational age (as if this represented confounding) (Fig. 5b),
shown by the box around this variable. However, here preterm
birth is an intermediate between pre-eclampsia and cerebral palsy,
and not a common cause of both.
By (over)adjusting, we take away part of the detrimental effect
of pre-eclampsia, that mediated through preterm birth. This
adjustment can attenuate the true effect of the exposure and even
reverse it. An early study found that maternal pre-eclampsia was
protective in very preterm infants, but detrimental to those born
at a later gestation.37 This was a surprising result—as a pathologic
condition, we would expect pre-eclampsia to be detrimental
across the entire spectrum of gestations.38,39 Visualised as a DAG,
this ﬁnding could be due to the conditioning on gestational age at
birth. In this case, conditioning does not take place through
statistical adjustment, but by stratiﬁcation (performing separate
analyses in two groups) based on the criterion of gestational age
at birth (preterm birth). This closes the causal path from pre-
eclampsia to cerebral palsy via preterm birth, and could lead to
bias.
However, the true situation is probably more complex.
Examining a more realistic DAG, to which chorioamnionitis (as
another cause of both preterm birth and cerebral palsy) has been
added (Fig. 5c), one can see that gestational age, as the shared
effect of both pre-eclampsia and chorioamnionitis, also acts as a
collider. Critically, closing one path between two variables may
lead to a change in other potential paths between the two.
Conditioning on gestational age opens a previously closed path,
from pre-eclampsia to cerebral palsy through preterm birth and
chorioamnionitis. This creates a new source of bias, and another
reason for the counterintuitive association found in our example. If
we analyse the relationship between pre-eclampsia and the
outcome within the group of preterm infants, a faulty comparison
group and a spurious association will be created. If a preterm baby
is born to a mother who has pre-eclampsia, the baby will be less
likely to have chorioamnionitis and vice versa. Among preterm
infants the effect of pre-eclampsia on cerebral palsy will be
compared with the effect of another signiﬁcant cause of cerebral
palsy, chorioamnionitis, and pre-eclampsia will falsely appear to
be protective. Thus, the estimated direct causal effect of pre-
eclampsia on the outcome will be biased (through the effect of
chorioamnionitis). Although widely used, conditioning on gesta-
tional at birth in studies of prenatal exposures and their
relationship to postnatal outcomes may not reduce but actually
lead to bias through overadjustment and faulty comparisons as
illustrated above,40–43 and generate counterintuitive results and
apparent changes of effect in different groups of patients.
Disentangling confounders from mediators and colliders can
prove challenging. Statistical tests reveal only the strength of an
association between two variables, not the causal relationship
between them, and in this context the researcher must rely on
causal reasoning.44 Here, DAGs, supported by subject-matter
knowledge, can be helpful as they illustrate a modern deﬁnition of
confounding:45,46 a common cause of both the exposure and the
outcome under study. This demonstrates how older deﬁni-
tions,47,48 focusing on factors associated with the exposure and
also related to the risk of disease in the unexposed, and not being
an intermediate (i.e. on associations rather than presumed causal
relationships), may lead to biased statistical estimates due to
inappropriate adjustment for a common effect of two variables
(conditioning on a collider).
THE LANGUAGE OF DAGS AS APPLIED TO INTERVENTIONAL
STUDIES
The DAG in Fig. 6a shows the causal structure of a randomised
controlled trial (RCT) randomising women to an intervention
promoting breastfeeding, the Baby Friendly Hospital Initiative
(BFHI),49 to examine cognitive development in childhood.50
Preterm birth
Pre-eclampsia
Pre-eclampsia
Pre-eclampsia
Chorioamnionitis
c
b
a
Cerebral palsy
Cerebral palsy
Cerebral palsy
Preterm birth
Preterm birth
Fig. 5 a Pre-eclampsia increases the risk of cerebral palsy directly,
and indirectly by increasing preterm birth. b By adjusting for
preterm birth, we underestimate the overall effect of pre-eclampsia
on cerebral palsy. c Adjusting for preterm birth causes the estimated
effect of pre-eclampsia on cerebral palsy to suffer from both
overadjustment and selection bias
Confounders
Confounders
b
a
Randomisation
Randomisation
BFHI
BFHI
Breastfeeding
Breastfeeding
Clinic attendance
Cognitive
development
Cognitive
development
Fig. 6 a The structure of a randomised controlled trial (RCT); BFHI
refers to the Baby Friendly Hospital Initiative. b Loss to follow-up in
an RCT creates selection bias
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Random assignment determines the exposure (BFHI) which in turn
inﬂuences the outcome (cognitive development) via mediators
such as breastfeeding (and probably others, not shown). Even if
there are confounders that inﬂuence both the chance of
breastfeeding and the outcome, they do not bias the causal
effect of the random assignment on the outcome, as breastfeed-
ing is a collider in the path between random assignment and
cognitive development via potential confounders, and blocks this
path. Therefore, as regards confounding, an intention-to-treat
analysis (according to how a mother was randomised) is likely to
be unbiased, and DAGs demonstrate the critical value of
randomisation in inferring unbiased causal relationships. A per-
protocol analysis of whether a mother actually breastfed is not
immune to confounding, as it resembles an observational study
where a backdoor path exists between breastfeeding and the
outcome via any confounders.51 Of course, the effect of treatment
actually received may be of interest, and a per-protocol analysis,
carefully controlled for confounders, may be justiﬁed to extract
the maximum of information from clinical trials.52
Whilst RCTs and intention-to-treat analyses minimise threats to
validity posed by confounding, they are not immune to other
biases, including information bias (see glossary) and bias due to
differential loss to follow-up. It is plausible that the BFHI might
lead to differences in health awareness in the intervention group,
leading to a different likelihood of follow-up clinic attendance. In
addition, mothers with a child exhibiting signs of impaired
cognitive development could also be more likely to attend follow-
up to ﬁnd out whether their child was developing normally. Seen
as a DAG (Fig. 6b), both the BFHI and the outcome have a causal
effect on the chance of follow-up. Examining data only on children
who attend follow-up (conditioning on follow-up, represented by
the box around clinic attendance), introduces bias into the
relationship between the intervention and cognitive development
via a faulty comparison, opening an otherwise closed path.
Conditioning on a collider leads to what is called collider
stratiﬁcation bias.53,54 This example illustrates that whilst RCTs
minimise confounding, they are still susceptible to bias such as
that introduced by loss to follow up.
LIMITATIONS OF DAGS AND SOME CAVEATS ON THEIR USE
One limitation of DAGs is their non-parametric nature: they
neither specify the form of the causal relationships, nor depict the
size of the associations, and remain qualitative in nature. A DAG
shows that uncontrolled confounding might bias the results, but
does not give a quantitative measure of this.10,55 Another is that a
DAG can only be as good as the background information used to
create it;56 a DAG is complete and therefore has a causal
interpretation only if it contains all common causes of any two
variables (all confounders), including both measured and unmea-
sured variables. A further limitation is the inability of DAGs to
depict random, as opposed to systematic, error. For instance,
randomisation allocates known and unknown confounders
equally between groups in the “average” ideal case. This does
not always happen in real-world RCTs, where confounding, due to
random differences at baseline, can—and indeed often does—
occur, but is not shown by DAGs. Ignoring random error also
means that when examining misclassiﬁcation (information) bias,
concepts such as non-differential measurement error (where error
is randomly distributed across the groups being studied) cannot
be incorporated into a DAG.
More subtly, and of relevance not only to DAGs but to any
analytical approach, the research question inﬂuences how we
consider variables and therefore analyse the data. A variable may
be simultaneously a mediator, a collider or a confounder, can be
interpreted differently in separate research questions using the
same data, and these will dictate different analytical strategies. For
example, in the study looking at the relationship between
antenatal steroids and BPD, one could ask about the effect of
steroids (exposure) on the outcome. Here the need for mechanical
ventilation is a mediator and should not be conditioned on.
However, if one were to investigate the effect of mechanical
ventilation (treating it as an exposure) on the risk of BPD,
antenatal steroids are a confounder in the backdoor path between
mechanical ventilation and the outcome, and should be condi-
tioned on. In addition, it is possible that two researchers might ask
the same research question, using the same variables in their
analyses, but choose to condition on different variables because
they have different opinions regarding the underlying causal
relationship. Representing their analyses as DAGs allows an
explicit comparison between the two approaches should their
ﬁndings differ.
Finally, throughout this article we have, of necessity, presented
simple examples to illustrate our key points. Partly, this is inherent
to the approach: any graphical method is likely to over-simplify
the complex biological reality being investigated. DAGs have for
this reason attracted criticism because they may lead to over-
simpliﬁcation in the ﬁeld of causal inference.57,58 DAGs however
do not lead per se to oversimpliﬁed analyses, but only explicitly
present their underlying assumptions. There are also a number of
theoretical points, such as the exact distinction between selection
bias and confounding, that remain contested.59,60 We therefore
direct interested readers to more in-depth reviews about the
theory and limitations of DAGs.8,10,61,62
CONCLUSION
The aim of much clinical research is to elucidate and test causal
relationships. In epidemiological terms, we want to establish
exposures that might be amenable to modiﬁcation, and test
interventions acting on these leading to an improvement in health
outcomes. Critical to a correct interpretation of causal relation-
ships is correctly identifying and appropriately adjusting for
confounders and potential sources of bias. In this review we have
shown that DAGs can illustrate threats to validity found to greater
or lesser extents in virtually all clinical research: confounding,
selection (or collider-stratiﬁcation) bias and overadjustment. We
believe that DAGs are useful for practising clinicians in interpret-
ing research that deals with proposed causal relationships, by
allowing them to frame research questions and ﬁndings using the
concepts of exposures, outcomes, intermediates, confounders and
colliders. They remind those planning observational studies to
collect sufﬁcient data to condition on possible confounders, and
to appropriately adjust for these in analyses, whilst refraining from
inappropriate adjustments. Finally, they show that whilst rando-
misation does minimise the risks of confounding in interventional
studies, possibilities for bias remain, for example through loss to
follow-up.
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